Motivatedbyelectroniccommerce,thispaperisamechanismdesignstudyforsellersofmultipleidentical items.Inthemarketenvironmentweconsider,participantsareriskneutralandtime-sensitive,withthesame discountfactor;potentialbuyershaveunitdemandandarrivesequentiallyaccordingtoarenewalprocess; andvaluationsaredrawnindependentlyfromthesameregulardistribution.FromtheRevelationPrinciple, wecanrestrictourattentiontodirectdynamicmechanismstakingasequenceofvaluationsandarrivalepochs asastrategicinput.Wede…netwoproperties(discretenessandstability),andprovethatunderaregularity assumptionontheinter-arrivaltimedistribution,wemayatnocostofgeneralityconsideronlymechanisms satisfyingthem.Thise¤ectivelyreducesthemechanisminputtoasequenceofvaluations,allowingusto formulatetheproblemasadynamicprogram(DP).BecausethisDPisequivalenttoawell-knownin…nite horizonasset-sellingproblem,wecan…nallycharacterizetheoptimalmechanismasasequenceofposted pricesincreasingwitheachsale.Ournumericalstudyindicatesthat,withuniformvaluations,thebene…t ofdynamicpricingovera…xedpostedpricemaybesmall.Besides,postedpricesarepreferabletoonline auctionsforalargenumberofitemsorhighinterestrate,butinothercasesauctionsareclosetooptimal andsigni…cantlymorerobust.
Eachbuyer n isrisk-neutralandhasalinearutilitycharacterizedbyaprivatelyknown randomvaluationfunction v n (t) (maximumwillingnesstopay),where t denotethetime whenthetransactionisrealized(ifapplicable).Mostofthispaperfocusesonthecase case"withrecall".However,ouranalysiswillalsoextendtothe impatient bidderscase(or
time-discountfactor ® 2 (0; 1).Whilethisconceptwillbede…nedmorepreciselylateralong withtheparticipants'utilityfunctions,itsloosemeaningisthatthenetvaluetotheseller (resp.bidder n)ofanypro…t y occuringattime t is ® t y (resp. ® t¡tn y).
Inadditiontoriskneutralityandthestationarityofdemandimpliedbytheassumptionsof i.i.dvaluationsandrenewalarrivalprocess,fourothersalientassumptionsaboutthemarket environmentwehaveeithermadeinthissectionorwillmakelaterinthepaperare: 
as P .
For Ã =( q n ;y n ) n¸1 tobean admissible mechanism,we…rstimposethattheallocation componentfunctionssatisfythe availabilitycontraint (AC1):
, ' n 2 © n and t¸t n (thetotalnumberofitemsallocatedafterthe n th bidderhasarrived canneverexceed K).Moresaliently,wealsoimposethatthecomponentfunctions q n i (:) and y n i (:) for n¸i¸1 have simultaneousstep realizations.Thatis,foreverydemandstream ' 2 © andbuyerindex i¸1; either q n i (' n ;t)=y n i (' n ;t)=0forall n¸i and t¸t n (bidder
and
1if n¸s i (') and t¸¿ i ('); 0 otherwise and
and t¸¿ i ('); 0 otherwise (bidder i getsanitemattime ¿ i (') and simultaneouslypays y i (') forit-y n i ( : )thuscorrespondstoacumulativetransferpayment function).Wede…nebyextensionther.v. y i ('), s i (') and ¿ i (') toberespectivelyequal to 0, +1 and +1 intheformercase,andwede…nether.v. q i (') tobeequalto 0 inthe formercaseand 1 inthelatter.Also,wewillomitfromnowonthedependenceofallr.v.
on ' and Ã whenitisclearfromcontext.
Whilewewillusethecomponentfunctionsof (q n ;y n ) inourstudyoftheoptimalmechanismpropertiesofsection2.3below,wewillonlyneedinsubsequentsectionsthereducedsets ofvariables (q n ;y n ;¿ n ) n¸1 or (q n ;y n ;s n ) n¸1 .De…nethe ¾-algebras F = ¾('), F n;t = ¾(f' m and t m+1 >t:m¸nand t m · tg) and F ¿ n = fA 2F:A\f¿ n ·tg2F n;t forall t¸0g.
Intermsof (q n ;y n ;¿ n ) n¸1 ,theconditionthatthemechanism (Ã n ) n¸1 isadmissible(more feasibilityconditionswillbeimposedshortly)canbesummarizedwith (AC):
and ' 2 ©;and f¿ n · tg2F n;t forall t¸0 and n¸1( cSS0)
forall n¸1 and ' 2 ©;( cSS3) q n 2f0;1g;y n¸0 ;¿ n¸tn forall n¸1 and ' 2 ©: (cSS4)
Inwords,werestrictourattentiontotheclassofmechanismswherefulltransferpayments frombuyersoccurinstantaneouslyupontheallocationofanitemtothem.Notethatdelayed andcontinuouspaymentschemesinparticulararetherebyexcluded.
Thelasttwoconstraintsin (1) 
forall ' 2 ©, n¸1, v 0 2 V and t¸0 suchthat t¸t n .Inwords, '[v 0 ;n;t] isthearrival streamobtainedwhenthe n-thbidderwithtype (v n ;t n ) pretendsinsteadthathisvaluation is v 0 andhisarrivalepoch t¸t n ;anappropriatewaytoenforcefullincentivecompatibility
Animportantremarkisthat ( Finally,weobservethataformulationofthemechanismdesignproblemcorrespondingto theimpatientbidderscaseisobtainedbyaddingto(1)theconstraint (IB):q n =1)¿ n = t n forall n,thatisbymerelyconsideringasubsetofthefeasiblesolutionspacefor(1).
2.3.OptimalMechanismProperties. Inthissectionweintroducetwopropertiesof dynamicmechanismsholdingunderassumption (A1),andshowthatitiscostlesstorestrict
oursearchtomechanismssatisfyingthem;thislaterenablesustosigni…cantlysimplifythe formulationofourproblem.
Wewillassumeintherestofthepaperthatthehypothesis (A1) requiredbyProposition 1holds;itissatis…edinparticularbyallIFRdistributions.Thisjusti…esthatwerestrict ourselvesfromnowontodiscretemechanisms,anduseinsteadthesimpli…edde…nitions
where
Inthissetting,thetwovariables ¿ n and s n becomeredundant,since ¿ n = t sn forall '.The
cSS4) and t n with n in (cSS4),where F sn = fA 2F :A\fs n ·mg2F m forall m¸1g. 
Theorem2 Ifthereexistsadiscreteoptimalmechanism,therealsoexistsanoptimalmechanismwhichisstable.
Proof. Let Ã =(Ã n ) ņ 1 beadiscretesolutionto(1).Inthefollowing,weprovebyinduction thatforall N¸1 thereexistsamechanismÃ whichisoptimaland N -stable.
Let N 2f 0 ;1 ;:::g andassumethat Ã isoptimaland N -stable(byextension,wede…ne allfeasiblemechanismstobe 0-stable-thebaseoftheinductionisthusincludedinwhat
Bycontradiction,assumeinstead
;t N+2 ¡ t N+1 +t N+1 ;:::;t n ¡t N+1 +t N+1 )) for n¸N +1:
wherethe…rstequalityfollowsfromthefactthat ® t s 0 y n`i s F N -measurablefor`· k and
process;thethirdfromtheconstructionofÃ;andthefourthfrom(2).Equation(3)andthe factthatÃ is N -stableimply…nally
ThislastequalityprovesthatÃ isoptimal,whichconcludestheproof.
Becauseweassume (A1) toholdthroughoutthispaper,thecombinationofProposition1
andTheorem2justi…esthatwerestrictourattentiontodiscreteandstablemechanisms,and workfromnowonwiththeyetsimplerde…nitions q n : V n 7 !f0;1g n and y n :
Wenextapplytoourproblemthemethodologydevelopedinsection4ofMyerson ( 
wherethesecondequalityisobtainedafterapplyingFubini'stheoremandintegratingby partthesecondtermoftheright-handsideofthe…rstequalityandre-arrangingterms.
Combiningthislastexpressionwith(4)andapplyingthemonotoneconvergencetheorem yieldsthealternativeequivalentformulation:
Notethatonlythevariables (q n ;s n ) n¸1 relativetotheallocationdecisionsappearinthe …rsttermoftheright-handsideof(5).Wecanthusexploitthefollowingconsequenceof
subjectto (AC); (IP1); (dSS0); (dSS2) and:
and (y n ) n¸1 canbefoundsuchthat (IC1); (dSS1); (dSS3) and (dSS4) aresatis…edand E[u n (v)]=0forall n,then (q n ;y n ;s n ) n¸1 isanoptimalsolutiontotheoriginalproblem(1).
(wedenotethecorrespondingprobabilitylawby H ).The solutiontothisclassicalproblemistoimmediatelyacceptanyo¤er w n suchthat w n¸¹ w,
where ¹ w satis…es
isnondecreasing (assumption (A2) discussedinsection2.1),thisisequivalenttoimmediatelysellingtheitem tothe…rstbidder n suchthat v n¸p1 ; where p 1 satis…es
Whenmultipleitemsareforsale( K>1 ),theoptimalpolicyisfoundbyintroducing astatevariable k 2f 1 ;:::;Kg representingthenumberofitemsremainingtobesold,and applyingthesameresultthroughbackwardsinductionon k byaddingtoeachitem'sselling priceintheBellmanequationfor(6)theoptimalexpecteddiscountedrevenueassociated withthesaleofalltheotheritemsstillremainingatthatpoint.Consequently,thereexists
and n`= minfn>ǹ ¡ 1 :v n¸p K ¡ +1 g for`¸2 (arrivalindexof…rstand`-thbuyers, respectively)and`(n)= ½ maxf`: n`<ngif n 1 <n 0otherwise (numberofitemssoldbythe n-
Therefore,ifwesetŷ n = p K¡`(n) 1fv n¸pK¡`(n) g,wehave E[u n (v)]=0forall n as:
Inaddition,itisstraightforwardtoverifythatŷ n satis…esconstraints (IC1); (dSS1); (dSS3) and (dSS4);wehavethereforeproventhatthemechanism (q n ;ŷ n ;ŝ n ) n¸1 isanoptimal solutiontoourmechanismdesignproblem(1 
lastexpressioncalculatedexplicitlyintothe…rst-orderconditionassociatedwith (8)yields therecursivesystemappearinginthefollowingtheorem,whichsummarizesouranalysis.
where R k istheoptimalexpecteddiscountedrevenue-to-gowhen k itemsareavailablefor saleattime 0. DP ¤ isalsooptimalfortheimpatientbiddersproblemandthetime-strategic biddersproblemobtainedbyrespectivelyaddingconstraint (IB) and (IC 0 ) to( 1 ).
Inordertointerpretsystem (9),weusetheanalogybetweenmechanismdesignand monopolypricingintroducedinBulowandRoberts(1989).Letus…rstconsiderthesingle-itemcase K =1 :ReplacingintheusualCournotframeworkthe"quantity" q withthe Proposition2 Proposition3 
3.NumericalStudy
Thepurposeofournumericalstudyistocompareunderdi¤erentscenariostheperfor-manceoftheoptimalmechanism DP ¤ derivedintheprevioussectionwiththatoftwoother dynamicmechanismswidelyusedinpractice:…xedpostedpriceandonlineauction.Inthe remainderofthispaper,wewillrefertoamechanism Ã characterizedbyavectorofpara-
We turnnowtotheprecisede…nitionofthetwomechanismsjustmentioned:
A…xedpostedprice p isusedforall K transactions,and thispriceischosenoptimally.Thatis, p maximizesover V theexpecteddiscountedrevenue 
where ¡ ¤ (a;z)´R WithuniformvaluationsandaPoissonbidderarrivalprocesswithrate¸,theexpression inthesamemarketenvironments,usingequations(10), (11)and 
4.Conclusion
Inthispaper,weformulateandsolveacontinuous-timedynamicmechanismdesignprob- 
